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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 06-4930

ANTHONY CANTERNA; PATRICIA CANTERNA
Appellants.
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DEPARTMENT
OF THE TREASURY; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cv-01783)
District Judge: Hon. David Stewart Cercone

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 7, 2008

Before: FISHER, GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges
Opinion Filed: August 4, 2008

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Anthony and Patricia Canterna filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking a refund of tax and interest paid for the
1986 tax year as a result of a disallowance of losses claimed in that year by Quartet Films
Associates, a partnership in which they had an interest. The District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the government on the basis of res judicata and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7422(h). The Canternas appealed. The issue on appeal is
whether the District Court abused its discretion in admitting late-discovered evidence which
formed the factual basis upon which summary judgment was granted. Specifically, the
evidence was necessary to resolve a factual dispute between the parties regarding whether
notice of a Tax Court proceeding involving Quartet was provided to the Canternas, with such
notice establishing, as a matter of law, that the Canternas were parties to such proceeding (for
purposes of res judicata) and the refunds sought by the Canternas were attributable to items
treated as partnership, rather than non-partnership, items (for determination of jurisdiction
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7422(h)). Because we find that the District Court properly exercised
its discretion in admitting the evidence at issue, and, in light of such evidence, there is no
dispute that, as a matter of law, the Canternas’ refund claim is barred by res judicata and 26
U.S.C. § 7422(h), we will affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in
favor of the government.1

1

Because it is undisputed that the documentary evidence at issue proves proper
notice was given to the Canternas, we also hold that the Canternas were not deprived, as
2

I. BACKGROUND
As the facts are well known to the parties, we will summarize only those pertinent to
resolving the sole issue on appeal.
In 1986, the Canternas invested in the partnership known as Quartet Films Associates,
and they reported their partnership share of income and losses for that year on their joint
federal income tax return. According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), a Notice of
Beginning of Administrative Proceeding (NBAP) was issued on November 28, 1989,
informing all Quartet partners that Quartet was the subject of an audit for 1986. On October
29, 1990, the IRS issued a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA)
to all of Quartet’s partners, informing them of adjustments that had been made to Quartet’s
partnership return. The Canternas, however, claim to have not received either notice,
although it is undisputed that copies of both the NBAP and FPAA appear in the Canternas’
IRS administrative file and are correctly addressed to them.2
On December 24, 1990, Quartet’s tax matters partner timely petitioned the Tax Court,
challenging the FPAA. On September 22, 1999, the Tax Court entered an order, pursuant
to a settlement agreement, disallowing 50% of Quartet’s losses for the 1986 tax year. On
September 20, 2000, the IRS notified the Canternas of the disallowance of a portion of

they argue, of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
2

The NBAP was sent to the Canternas’ correct address, but only specified Anthony
Canterna as the addressee. However, this discrepancy is not relevant because the proper
mailing of the FPAA, which lists both Anthony and Patricia Canterna as addressees, is the
dispositive fact in the summary judgment order and in this appeal.
3

Quartet’s losses that they had reported on their 1986 tax return and demanded payment of
additional taxes.3 On October 23, 2000, the IRS notified the Canternas of interest charged
as a result of the disallowance.
On February 7, 2001, the Canternas paid the $76,780 tax deficiency plus $179,154 in
interest and filed an amended 1986 tax return requesting a refund for those amounts. The
IRS denied the refund. On November 20, 2003, the Canternas filed an action against the
government in the District Court, seeking a refund of tax and interest for the 1986 tax year.
Pre-trial proceedings were referred to a Magistrate Judge. The government provided
responses to the Canternas’ first discovery requests on April 28, 2004, and sent them its
required initial disclosures under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 on May 24, 2004.
On November 17, 2004, the government filed a motion for summary judgment. The
government argued that the Canternas were deemed parties to the Quartet partnership
proceeding in the Tax Court and res judicata barred their complaint. Moreover, the
government argued that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7422(h) (precluding actions against the government for a tax refund attributable to
partnership items). On June 23, 2005, the District Court denied the motion because the

3

A partnership is not itself a taxable entity. 26 U.S.C. § 701. Rather, each partner
must report his distributive share of the partnership’s items of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit, or other taxable income or loss. 26 U.S.C. § 702(a). Accordingly,
the partnership adjustments detailed in the FPAA, and later modified by the Tax Court’s
order affected all partners’ tax returns because adjustments to the Quartet partnership
return flowed directly through to the partners’ shares of Quartet’s income, deductions,
and credits.
4

government had not demonstrated that the NBAP or FPAA had actually been mailed to the
Canternas’ correct address; thus, a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the
Canternas were provided with notice and were thus parties to the Tax Court proceeding.
On July 8, 2005, the Magistrate Judge granted the government’s motion to reopen
discovery for a period of 60 days, or until September 7, 2005, for the limited purpose of
determining whether the Canternas received notice. The IRS did not locate the relevant
documentary evidence establishing proper notice by the end of the discovery period. The
search, however, continued.

On October 14, 2005, in the general files at the IRS

Brookehaven Service Center, the government found a certified mail listing, with the U.S.
Postal Service stamp on such listing, reflecting that the FPAA was mailed to the Canternas’
correct address on October 29, 1990. On October 18, 2005, the government disclosed the
certified mail listing by letter and included copies of the listing with their Fed. R. Civ. P. 26
supplemental disclosure. In its letter to the Canternas’ attorney, the government attributed
the late discovery to (1) the length of time that had passed between the 1986 tax year and the
Canternas’ claim and (2) the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which caused delay in
discovering and disclosing evidence because a portion of the Quartet file was destroyed in
the IRS’s Manhattan office.
On November 25, 2005, the Canternas filed a motion requesting the court to exclude
the certified mail listing as a discovery sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Specifically,
the Canternas alleged that the government violated the July 8, 2005, discovery order when

5

it untimely filed a Rule 26 supplemental disclosure attempting to introduce previously
undisclosed documents. On January 31, 2006, the Magistrate Judge denied the motion in part
by admitting the late-discovered mail listing but granted the motion in part by reopening the
discovery period so that the Canternas could take the deposition of the IRS employee who
had supervised the search for the mail listing.4
On May 8, 2006, the government renewed its motion for summary judgment, asserting
the same arguments in its original motion, but including the certified mailing list to
demonstrate that the FPAA had been properly issued and mailed to the Canternas. In their
opposition memo, the Canternas conceded that, given the certified mail listing, the FPAA
was properly mailed to them prior to the conclusion of the underlying Tax Court proceeding.
On October 30, 2006, the District Court, after adopting the opinion of the Magistrate Judge,
entered an order granting the government’s motion for summary judgment. In reaching its
decision, the court concluded that, because the undisputed mailing of the FPAA established
proper notice to the Canternas before the conclusion of the underlying Tax Court proceeding,
the Canternas were deemed parties to such proceeding for purposes of res judicata claim
preclusion and their partnership items cannot be treated as nonpartnership items for purposes
of avoiding application of § 7422(h)–application of which deprives the District Court of
jurisdiction over the claim. The Canternas appealed.

4

The court further required the government to either produce for deposition an
IRS agent to authenticate the evidence at the Canternas’ attorney’s office or pay the
reasonable costs and attorneys fees for their attorney’s attendance at the deposition.
6

II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s jurisdiction over civil actions for refunds instituted by a taxpayer
against the United States is derived from 26 U.S.C. § 7422. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over an appeal from a final decision of a district court.
It is well recognized that “the scope and conduct of discovery are within the sound
discretion of the trial court,” Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983),
and a district court’s “decision whether to penalize non-compliance with a deadline is
entrusted to the discretion of the court that imposed it,” Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932
F.2d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 1991). See also Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,
475 F.3d 524, 538 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We ... review a district court’s decision to impose
preclusion sanctions [for discovery violations] for abuse of discretion.”). Our review of a
district court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is plenary.

Marra v.

Philadelphia Housing Authority, 497 F.3d 286, 297 (3d Cir. 2007). Furthermore, we will
uphold a district court’s order granting summary judgment so long as the record demonstrates
that “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, the Canternas argue that the District Court abused its discretion when it
admitted the government’s late-discovered evidence instead of precluding such evidence as

7

a discovery sanction under Rule 37. 5 Notwithstanding the factual dispute on appeal, the
Canternas do not challenge the District Court’s (1) holding, as a matter of law, that the
mailing of the FPAA establishes notice even in the absence of actual receipt by the tax
payers; (2) application of res judicata to the facts of the case; or (3) interpretation of the
relevant portions of the Internal Revenue Code for determining party status, treatment of
partnership shares, and subject matter jurisdiction. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6223(e)(3), 6226(c),
6231(a)(3),(b)(1)(D), 7422(h).6 Accordingly, the sole issue in this appeal is whether the
District Court abused its discretion in admitting the late-discovered evidence, without which

5

Rule 37(c)(1) provides for an evidentiary preclusion sanction for certain
discovery violations. The rule states:
A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information
required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to
discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is
harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion
any witness or information not so disclosed. In addition to or in lieu of this
sanction, the court, on motion and after affording an opportunity to be
heard, may impose other appropriate sanctions. In addition to requiring
payment of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure, these sanctions may include any of the actions authorized under
Rule 37(b)(2)(A), (B), and (C) and may include informing the jury of the
failure to make the disclosure.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
6

See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6223(e)(3) (circumstances under which a partner may elect to
have his partnership items treated as nonpartnership items), 6226(c) (partners treated as
parties to a proceeding), 6231(a)(3) (defining partnership items), 6231(b)(1)(D)
(circumstances under which the partnership items of a partner for a partnership taxable
year become nonpartnership items), 7422(h) (precluding action for a refund attributable to
partnership items when such items are treated as partnership, rather than nonpartnership,
items).
8

it could not have granted summary judgment because there would have existed a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether proper notice was given.7
This Court recognizes that the exclusion of evidence for failure to comply with a
pretrial order is an “extreme sanction” that is not normally imposed “absent a showing of
willful deception or ‘flagrant disregard’ of a court order by the proponent of the evidence.”
Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass’n, 559 F.2d 894, 905 (3d Cir. 1977)
(quoting Dudley v. South Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1977)); see also In re
TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 721 (3d Cir. 1999).

The factors to be considered in

determining whether a district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding or
admitting untimely evidence include:
(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the [evidence is
offered], (2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice, (3) the extent to
which [allowing late-offered evidence] would disrupt the orderly and efficient
trial of the case or of other cases in the court, and (4) bad faith or willfulness
in failing to comply with the district court's order.

Meyers, 559 F.2d at 904-05. Applying these considerations to the instant case, we conclude
that the District Court properly exercised its discretion when it denied in part the Canternas’
motion for sanction under Rule 37(c)(1) by admitting the late-discovered, yet unquestionably
probative, documentary evidence.
We find there was neither prejudice nor surprise to the Canternas. The Canternas

7

The Canternas do not raise any objection to the admissibility of the certified
mailing list other than the delayed production.
9

were well aware, early on in the litigation, that the IRS had records suggesting that it had
mailed the NBAP and FPAA to the Canternas correct address. In response to their request
for production of documents, the government produced correctly addressed copies of the
NBAP and FPAA that were allegedly mailed to the Canternas. The government also
explained that portions of Quartet’s administrative file had been lost in the destruction of the
IRS’s Manhattan office on September 11, 2001. The government was granted a 60 day
discovery extension for the sole purpose of locating further evidence of actual mailing; thus,
the Canternas were aware that the discovery of more conclusive and direct evidence was
possible. Furthermore, the production of the mail listing cannot be characterized as having
been produced on the proverbial “eve of trial.” Moreover, the Canternas failed to show that
they were prejudiced. They have not explained how their case could have been presented in
a more positive light had they gained access to the mail listing earlier in the proceedings.
Even if there had been any prejudice to the Canternas due to the late discovery of evidence,
the prejudice was cured when the Canternas were granted additional time to conduct
depositions.
Finally, there is no evidence that the late discovery of the evidence was due to bad
faith or willfulness on the part of the government. The record fails to support the Canternas’
claim that the government was less than diligent in its conduct of the litigation. Moreover,
it is understandable that the destruction of the IRS’s Manhattan office on September 11,
2001, caused substantial disruption in that agency’s record-keeping systems and may have
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prevented strict compliance with discovery schedules.

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the late-discovered evidence; thus, there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding notice. Accordingly, we will affirm the summary judgment in favor
of the government.
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